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Social Contracts on Social Networks: Local Patterns of Interaction, Local Strategy Dynamics and the Emergence of Reciprocity


Gregory Todd Jones


Georgia State University - College of Law; Georgia State University - Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution; University of Georgia - Terry College of Business; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Sarah F. Brosnan


Georgia State University

April 15, 2009

Context and the Evolution of Mechanisms for Solving Collective Action Problems Paper

Abstract:     
Cooperation has been vital to the evolution of all living things, including single-celled organisms (Velicer, 2005, 2003; Velicer and Stredwick, 2002; Crespi, 2001; Velicer et al., 2000; Boorman and Levitt, 1980), fish (Brosnan et al., 2003; Dugatkin, 1991, 1992, 1997; Milinski, 1987), birds (Brown and Brown, 1996; Faaborg et al., 1995), canines (Creel and Creel, 2002; Courchamp and Macdonald, 2001; Fentress and Ryon, 1986), felines (Caro, 1994; Packer and Pusey, 1982), non-human primates (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; de Waal, 1996, 1982; Harcourt and de Waal, 1992; Chapais, 1992), and humans (Ostrom et al., 1999; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Johnson et al., 2003).

Even so, the evolution of cooperative, prosocial behavior under circumstances in which individual interests are at odds with common interests, (circumstances characterized as social dilemmas (Gotts et al., 2003; Dawes and Messick, 2000)), remains a largely unsolved, multidisciplinary puzzle (Hammerstein, 2003). Approaches to these types of problems have, for the most part, been applications of evolutionary game theory (Gintis, 2000; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Maynard-Smith, 1982; Maynard-Smith and Price, 1973; Trivers, 1971; Hamilton, 1967; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and due to their importance as generalized models of many important socio-economic situations (Tomassini, 2006), iconic games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma have been widely employed as metaphors (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992, 2004; Nowak and May, 1992; Maynard-Smith, 1982; Sugden, 1986).

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Date posted: April 28, 2009 ; Last revised: May 18, 2010

Suggested Citation

Jones, Gregory Todd and Brosnan, Sarah F., Social Contracts on Social Networks: Local Patterns of Interaction, Local Strategy Dynamics and the Emergence of Reciprocity (April 15, 2009). Context and the Evolution of Mechanisms for Solving Collective Action Problems Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1376804 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1376804

Contact Information

Gregory Todd Jones (Contact Author)
Georgia State University - College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 4037
Atlanta, GA 30302-4037
United States
404-651-2377 (Phone)
Georgia State University - Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution ( email )
PO Box 4037
Atlanta, GA 30302-4037
United States
University of Georgia - Terry College of Business ( email )
Brooks Hall
Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Sarah F. Brosnan
Georgia State University ( email )
Atlanta, GA 30303
United States
4044136301 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.gsu.edu/~wwwcbs/
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