Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=137897
 
 

Citations (11)



 
 

Footnotes (123)



 


 



A Positive Theory of Chapter 11


Kevin A. Kordana


University of Virginia - School of Law

Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

October 1998

University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 61

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes the voting rules of Chapter 11 using models from noncooperative game theory. Prior work has relied mainly on a model of bargaining between the debtor and a single creditor with perfect information. We expand on this work by considering two-party bargaining with imperfect information, and bargaining (with perfect and imperfect information) among a single debtor and multiple creditors. In addition, prior work has focused on explaining the role of the exclusivity period, the absolute priority rule, and the liquidation floor in Chapter 11 bargaining. We also consider the role of majoritarianism and supermajoritarianism, bicameralism, and classification, and the desirability of allowing creditors to purchase claims from each other.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 82

JEL Classification: G33

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 17, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Kordana, Kevin A. and Posner, Eric A., A Positive Theory of Chapter 11 (October 1998). University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 61. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=137897 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.137897

Contact Information

Kevin A. Kordana (Contact Author)
University of Virginia - School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
804-924-3680 (Phone)
804-924-7536 (Fax)

Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 5,033
Downloads: 838
Download Rank: 14,640
Citations:  11
Footnotes:  123

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.266 seconds