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Diversification and the Value of Internal Capital Markets: The Case of Tracking Stock


Matthew T. Billett


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

David C. Mauer


Edwin L. Cox School of Business

October 1998


Abstract:     
Numerous studies document that diversified firms sell at a discount relative to comparable portfolios of stand-alone firms. One explanation is that these firms suboptimally invest by subsidizing poor performing business segments with resources from profitable business segments. On average, firms may indeed have internal capital markets that diminish firm value; however, it is also possible that internal capital markets add to firm value by relieving liquidity constraints. We examine the link between firm value and the value of internal capital markets using a relatively new form of corporate restructuring called tracking stock. We present a model that illustrates that the announcement effect of a tracking stock equity restructuring conveys information about the market's assessment of the value of a firm's internal capital market. We develop a direct measure of the profitability of the internal capital market, and we find a strong positive relation between it and tracking stock announcement effects, a finding consistent with our model.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34, L20

working papers series


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Date posted: November 5, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Billett, Matthew T. and Mauer, David C., Diversification and the Value of Internal Capital Markets: The Case of Tracking Stock (October 1998). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=138008 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.138008

Contact Information

Matthew T. Billett (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business ( email )
1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-3366 (Phone)
David C. Mauer
Edwin L. Cox School of Business ( email )
P.O. Box 750333
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, TX 75275-0333
United States
214-768-4150 (Phone)
214-768-4099 (Fax)
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