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Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Stock Price Informativeness


Christof Beuselinck


Catholic University of Lille - Institut d'Économie Scientifique et de Gestion (IESEG)

Philip Joos


Tilburg University

Inder K. Khurana


University of Missouri at Columbia - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business

Sofie Van der Meulen


Tilburg University - Department of Accounting & Accountancy

April 14, 2009


Abstract:     
In this paper, we examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS reduces firm opacity and contributes to stock price informativeness. Using data from EU countries, we document a V-shaped pattern in stock return synchronicity around IFRS adoption which is consistent with IFRS disclosures revealing new firm-specific information in the adoption period (i.e., a reduction of synchronicity) and subsequently lowering the surprise of future disclosures (i.e., an increase in synchronicity). We also find that mandatory IFRS adoption (1) increases analyst ability to incorporate industry-level information into stock prices and (2) reduces the private information advantage enjoyed by institutional owners. Further, our results are especially driven by firms domiciled in strong enforcement countries, highlighting the importance of enforcement quality for the transparency effects of IFRS. Overall, our study highlights the role of several key elements of the information environment and how these elements interact with accounting standards.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Mandatory IFRS adoption, stock price informativeness, synchronicity

JEL Classification: M41, M45, G12, N20

working papers series


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Date posted: April 16, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Beuselinck, Christof, Joos, Philip, Khurana, Inder K. and Van der Meulen, Sofie, Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Stock Price Informativeness (April 14, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1381242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1381242

Contact Information

Christof Beuselinck (Contact Author)
Catholic University of Lille - Institut d'Économie Scientifique et de Gestion (IESEG) ( email )
3 Rue de la Digue
Office: A321
Lille, 59000
France
+33320545892 (Phone)
Philip Joos
Tilburg University ( email )
Faculty of Economics and Business Admin
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
31 13 4668716 (Phone)
31 13 4668001 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/joos
Inder Khurana
University of Missouri at Columbia - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business ( email )
331 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-882-3474 (Phone)
573-882-2437 (Fax)
Sofie Van der Meulen
Tilburg University - Department of Accounting & Accountancy ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
31134668296 (Phone)
31134668001 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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