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Availability Cascades and Risk RegulationTimur KuranDuke University - Department of Economics Cass R. SunsteinHarvard Law School Stanford Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1999 U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 181 U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 384 Abstract: An availability cascade is a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception of increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse. The driving mechanism involves a combination of informational and reputational motives: Individuals endorse the perception partly by learning from the apparent beliefs of others and partly by distorting their public responses in the interest of maintaining social acceptance. Availability entrepreneurs - activists who manipulate the content of public discourse - strive to trigger availability cascades likely to advance their agendas. Their availability campaigns may yield social benefits, but sometimes they bring harm, which suggests a need for safeguards. Focusing on the role of mass pressures in the regulation of risks associated with production, consumption, and the environment, Professor Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein analyze availability cascades and suggest reforms to alleviate their potential hazards. Their proposals include new governmental structures designed to give civil servants better insulation against mass demands for regulatory change and an easily accessible scientific database to reduce people's dependence on popular (mis)perceptions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 90 Keywords: availability heuristic, informational cascades, reputational cascades, cost-benefit analysis JEL Classification: L51, K23 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: October 30, 1998Suggested Citation |
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