The Role of Banks in the Subprime Financial Crisis
Michele U. Fratianni
Indiana University - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy; Universita' Politecnica delle Marche
Nottingham Business School - Department of Economics; Università Politecnica delle Marche - Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.)
April 10, 2009
Review of Economic Conditions in Italy, 2009/1
The ultimate point of origin of the great financial crisis of 2007-2009 can be traced back to an extremely indebted US economy. The collapse of the real estate market in 2006 was the close point of origin of the crisis. The failure rates of subprime mortgages were the first symptom of a credit boom tuned to bust and of a real estate shock. But large default rates on subprime mortgages cannot account for the severity of the crisis. Rather, low-quality mortgages acted as an accelerant to the fire that spread through the entire financial system. The latter had become fragile as a result of several factors that are unique to this crisis: the transfer of assets from the balance sheets of banks to the markets, the creation of complex and opaque assets, the failure of ratings agencies to properly assess the risk of such assets, and the application of fair value accounting. To these novel factors, one must add the now standard failure of regulators and supervisors in spotting and correcting the emerging weaknesses. Accounting data fail to reveal the full extent of the financial maelstrom. Ironically, according to these data, US banks appear to be still adequately capitalized. Yet, bank undercapitalization is the biggest stumbling block to a resolution of the financial crisis.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: accounting, banks, credit, crisis, fair values, risk aversion, undercapitalization
JEL Classification: G01, G21, N20working papers series
Date posted: April 16, 2009 ; Last revised: February 28, 2012
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