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Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention


David M. Driesen


Syracuse University - College of Law

October 28, 1998


Abstract:     
Emissions trading has become a key component of U.S. environmental legal regimes. The U.S. has successfully lobbied to make international environmental benefit trading, an expanded form of emissions trading, a part of international efforts to address the threat of global climate change through the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol to that Convention. Legal scholars have lauded emissions trading as a "free lunch" that will encourage innovation, enhance democratic accountability, and reduce the cost of environmental cleanup. This article argues that emissions trading functions as a cheap fix, reducing short-term costs while tending to lessen innovation and thwart democratic accountability. Because of this, emissions trading will ultimately weaken efforts to address complex environmental problems, unless policymakers carefully limit trading programs to make sure that they do not undermine innovation and democratic accountability. The author recommends specific limits to international emissions trading designed to avoid undermining the long-term efficacy of the climate change regime.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 87

JEL Classification: D7, K2, K3, O3, Q4, Q2, Q0

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Date posted: November 9, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Driesen, David M., Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention (October 28, 1998). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=138503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.138503

Contact Information

David M. Driesen (Contact Author)
Syracuse University - College of Law ( email )
E.I. White Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244-1030
United States
315-443-4218 (Phone)
315-443-4141 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.syr.edu/faculty/facultymember.asp?fac=12
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