Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1385382
 
 

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Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market


Richard A. Epstein


New York University School of Law; Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; University of Chicago - Law School

M. Todd Henderson


University of Chicago - Law School

April 15, 2009

U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 458

Abstract:     
This paper examines the relative strength of two imperfect accounting rules: historical cost and mark to market. The manifest inaccuracy of historical cost is well known, and, paradoxically one source of its hidden strength. Because private parties know of its evident weaknesses they look elsewhere for information. In contrast, mark to market for hard-to-value assets has many hidden weaknesses. In this paper we show how it creates asset bubbles and exacerbate their negative collateral consequences once they burst. It does the former by allowing banks to adopt generous valuations in up-markets that increase their lending capacity. It does the latter by forcing the hand of counterparties to demand collateral even when watchful waiting and inaction is the more efficient course of action when the downward cascades generated by mark-to-market accounting may trigger massive sell-offs at prices below true asset value. The fears of private suits and regulatory sanctions on counterparties can compound the problem. Mark to market generates the functional equivalent of bank runs for which the functional equivalent of the automatic-stay rule in bankruptcy is the appropriate response.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: financial bailout, mark-to-market, historical cost, bubbles, regulation, securities

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Date posted: April 16, 2009 ; Last revised: August 8, 2010

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Richard A. and Henderson, M. Todd, Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market (April 15, 2009). U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 458. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1385382 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1385382

Contact Information

Richard A. Epstein
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012
United States
(212) 992-8858 (Phone)
(212) 995-4894 (Fax)
Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-9563 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
M. Todd Henderson (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-4168 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
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