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Economic Effects of Auction Bankruptcy

B. Espen Eckbo
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Karin S. Thorburn
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


April 16, 2009

Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2009-63

Abstract:     
We survey empirical research on the Swedish auction bankruptcy system, which requires that filing firms are put up for sale in an auction. The bids determine whether the firm will be liquidated piecemeal or continued as a going concern. The auctions are competitive and there is little evidence of fire-sales. Three-quarters of the firms survive the auction with their core assets intact. In contrast to evidence on reorganizations under Chapter 11 in the U.S., buyers in Sweden restructure the auctioned firms well enough for these firms to perform at par with industry rivals. The CEOs of auctioned firms suffer dramatic personal bankruptcy costs. Nevertheless, there is no indication that this results in value-destroying risk shifting behaviour prior to filing. Overall, the Swedish experience suggests that greater reliance on the auction mechanism, seen recently also in the U.S., enhances economic efficiency.

Keywords: Bankruptcy, auction, reorganization, liquidation, risk-shifting, asset substitution, fire-sale, bankruptcy costs

JEL Classifications: G33, G34, K22

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 16, 2009 ; Last revised: April 27, 2009

Suggested Citation

Eckbo, B. Espen and Thorburn, Karin S., Economic Effects of Auction Bankruptcy (April 16, 2009). Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2009-63. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1387347


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Contact Information

B. Espen Eckbo (Contact Author)
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-3953 (Phone)
603-646-3805 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/eckbo
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
Karin S. Thorburn
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration ( email )
Helleveien 30
Bergen 5045
Norway
HOME PAGE: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/thorburn
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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