Cross-Selling Lending and Underwriting: Scope Economies and Incentives
Posted: 21 Apr 2009
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Cross-Selling Lending and Underwriting: Scope Economies and Incentives
Date Written: April 2009
Abstract
We highlight the implications of combining underwriting services and lending for the choice of underwriters and for competition in the underwriting business. We show that cross-selling can increase underwriters' incentives, and we explain three phenomena: first, that cross-selling is important for universal banks to enter the investment banking business; second, that cross-selling is particularly attractive for highly leveraged borrowers; third, that less-than-market rates are no prerequisite for cross-selling to benefit a bank's clients. In our model, cross-selling reduces rents in the underwriting business.
Keywords: G21, G24, D49
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation