Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1390278
 
 

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Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation


Jill E. Fisch


Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School


Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 2009, p. 333, 2009
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-14

Abstract:     
Many critics argue that private securities litigation fails effectively either to deter corporate misconduct or to compensate defrauded investors. In particular, commentators reason that damages reflect socially inefficient transfer payments - the so-called circularity problem. Fox and Mitchell address the circularity problem by identifying new reasons why private litigation is an effective deterrent, focusing on the role of disclosure in improving corporate governance.

The corporate governance rationale for securities regulation is more powerful than the authors recognize. By collecting and using corporate information in their trading decisions, informed investors play a critical role in enhancing market efficiency. This efficiency, in turn, allows the capital markets to discipline management, producing a governance externality that improves corporate decision-making and benefits non-trading shareholders. As this article shows, this governance externality justifies compensating informed traders for their fraud-based trading losses.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: securities law, corporations, corporate misconduct, fraud-based trading losses, damages, transfer payments, inefficiency, deterrence, disclosure, transparency, corporate governance externality, market efficiency

JEL Classification: G38, K22, K42

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Date posted: April 17, 2009 ; Last revised: January 20, 2011

Suggested Citation

Fisch, Jill E., Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation. Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 2009, p. 333, 2009; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1390278

Contact Information

Jill E. Fisch (Contact Author)
Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-746-3454 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)
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