Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=139134
 
 

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Law and Finance


Rafael La Porta


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Florencio Lopez de Silanes


EDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Robert W. Vishny


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, December 1998

Abstract:     
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.

JEL Classification: G38, G32, K11, K12, K22

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: November 26, 1998  

Suggested Citation

La Porta, Rafael and Lopez de Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, December 1998. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=139134

Contact Information

Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Florencio Lopez de Silanes
EDHEC Business School ( email )
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
Nice, 06202
France
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07 (Phone)
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Andrei Shleifer (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Robert W. Vishny
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
312-702-2522 (Phone)
312-702-0118 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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