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Constitutional BorrowingNelson TebbeBrooklyn Law School Robert L. TsaiAmerican University - Washington College of Law April 23, 2009 Michigan Law Review, Vol. 108, 2010 Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 145 American University, WCL Research Paper No. 09-36 Abstract: Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated with liberty, on the one hand, and equality, on the other. We finish by discussing how attentiveness to borrowing may illuminate or improve prominent theories of constitutional lawmaking.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 66 Keywords: constitution, borrowing, First Amendment, Equal Protection, culture, minimalism, living constitutionalism, originalism, liberty, equality Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: April 20, 2009 ; Last revised: November 23, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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