Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392163
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (21)



 


 



The Theory of Regulatory Competition and Competition Law


Wolfgang Kerber


Philipps University Marburg - School of Business Administration and Economics

April 20, 2009


Abstract:     
The governance of competition on global markets is an open policy question (lack of international competition policy). In this paper, it is analyzed to what extent different types of regulatory competition, which in other regulatory contexts (as, e.g., corporate law) can be beneficial, might also be a solution in competition law (instead of seeking harmonisation and centralization). In a first step, it is demonstrated why regulatory competition of competition laws can only be beneficial under very spe-cial circumstances and should therefore be generally avoided. However, yardstick competition as one specific type of regulatory competition, which promotes innovation and mutual learning in regard to competition law rules and practices, might be so valuable that a fairly decentralised multi-level system of competition laws might be recommended. Therefore, in a second step, the basic elements of a global multi-level system of competition laws are presented, which allows for decentralised experimen-tation with new possibilities for protecting competition (laboratory federalism). Some conclusions are drawn for the International Competition Network (ICN).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: international competition policy, regulatory competition, competition law, antitrust law

JEL Classification: F02, F13, H77, K21

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 20, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Kerber, Wolfgang, The Theory of Regulatory Competition and Competition Law (April 20, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392163 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392163

Contact Information

Wolfgang Kerber (Contact Author)
Philipps University Marburg - School of Business Administration and Economics ( email )
Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany
+49 6421 2823921 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,207
Downloads: 338
Download Rank: 49,233
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  21

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.640 seconds