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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392917
 
 

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Share and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies and Information Sharing


Nathan Alexander Sales


Syracuse University College of Law

April 21, 2009

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-24
George Washington Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 279-352, February 2010

Abstract:     
Why don’t intelligence agencies share information with each other? This article attempts to answer that perennially vexing question by consulting public choice theory as well as insights from other legal disciplines. It begins by considering why intelligence agencies see information sharing as a threat to the various values they maximize, such as influence over senior executive branch policymakers and autonomy to pursue agency priorities. It then proposes a series of analytical frameworks that enrich our understanding of why agencies resist sharing: At times data exchange resembles an intellectual property problem, sometimes it looks like an antitrust problem, and sometimes it looks like an organizational theory problem. Finally, the article examines whether the solutions suggested by these other disciplines can be adapted to the problems of information sharing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 75

Keywords: 9-11, al qaeda, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, CIA, Central Intelligence Agency, CURVEBALL, Defense Intelligence Agency, eavesdropping, FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation, homeland security, horizontal, MKULTRA, NSA, National Security Agency, Pearl Harbor, September 11, vertical, wiretapping

JEL Classification: D23, D73, K21, O34

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: April 24, 2009 ; Last revised: April 6, 2010

Suggested Citation

Sales, Nathan Alexander, Share and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies and Information Sharing (April 21, 2009). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-24; George Washington Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 279-352, February 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392917

Contact Information

Nathan Alexander Sales (Contact Author)
Syracuse University College of Law ( email )
Syracuse, NY 13244-1030
United States
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