Managers’ Compensation and Misreporting: A Costly State Verification Approach
Angelo S. Baglioni
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan - Institute of Economy and Finance
Economic Inquiry, Vol. 47, Issue 2, pp. 278-289, April 2009
We look for the optimal shareholder-manager contract leading to high effort and truthful revelation of firm performance. This twofold incentive compatibility constraint calls for a convex compensation scheme (a fixed wage plus a stock option) coupled with a state contingent audit. In order to reduce expected verification costs, an optimal stock option plan assigns the manager a large number of options with high strike price. It is suggested that focusing the audit activity (and supervision) on the exercise of stock option packages is a better solution to the problem of misreporting than giving up stock options as a compensation tool.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 12
JEL Classification: D82, G30, M40, M52Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 16, 2009
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