Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Robin S. Lee
New York University, Stern School of Business
Yahoo! Research Labs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
NBER Working Paper No. w14922
We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Agents may learn preferences over partners via costly interviews. Although there exist multiple equilibria where all agents receive the same number of interviews, efficiency depends on overlap -- the number of common interview partners among agents. We prove the equilibria with the highest degree of overlap yields the highest probability of being matched. The analysis suggests that institutions which ration interviews or create labor market segmentation may lead to greater efficiency in information acquisition activities.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28working papers series
Date posted: April 29, 2009
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.453 seconds