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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395057
 
 

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Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discovery


Andrew Blair-Stanek


University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

Jan 1, 2010

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, January 2010

Abstract:     
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly has baffled and mystified both practitioners and scholars, casting aside the well-settled rule for evaluating motions to dismiss in favor of an amorphous “plausibility” standard. This Article argues that Twombly was not revolutionary but simply part of the Court’s ever-expanding application of the familiar three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge test. Misused discovery can deprive litigants of property and liberty interests, and in some cases Mathews requires the safeguard of dismissing the complaint. This Article’s insight explains Twombly’s origins and structure, while also suggesting a source for lower courts to draw on in developing post-Twombly jurisprudence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Twombly, Mathews v. Eldridge, discovery, pleading, procedural due process

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Date posted: April 28, 2009 ; Last revised: February 8, 2010

Suggested Citation

Blair-Stanek, Andrew, Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discovery (Jan 1, 2010). Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, January 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395057

Contact Information

Andrew Ralph Blair-Stanek (Contact Author)
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law ( email )
500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201-1786
United States
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