How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm's Deception?
Maurice E. Stucke
University of Tennessee College of Law
April 26, 2009
Southern Methodist University Law Review, Vol. 63, p. 1069, 2010
University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 57
This Article discusses deception and its potential anticompetitive effects. Since deception lacks any redeeming ethical, moral, or economic justifications, and trust in the marketplace is paramount, multiple laws seek to deter and punish deception. Although the federal antitrust laws seek to deter acts of unfair competition, which historically included a competitor’s deception, some federal courts, recently have erected hurdles for antitrust plaintiffs injured by a monopolist’s deception. Such hurdles are contrary to the Sherman Act's legislative aim, the common law antecedents of the Sherman Act, and other congressional policies. Moreover, the courts’ legal standards for evaluating a monopolist’s deception involving advertising and product disparagement, vaporware, standard-setting organizations, and other deceptive conduct differ. This Article proposes a “quick-look” legal standard for evaluating a monopolist’s alleged deception. It addresses how the standard promotes several rule-of-law principles and responds to several concerns about using the antitrust laws to combat deception.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 55
Keywords: Sherman Act, Antitrust, Competition Policy, Dominant Firm, Monopoly, Deception, Fraud, Section 2
JEL Classification: K21, L41, L12, K13Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 27, 2009 ; Last revised: February 22, 2012
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