Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Economics Working Paper No. 321

14 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 1998

See all articles by Jordi Brandts

Jordi Brandts

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona

Gary Charness

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics

Abstract

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our 'hot' treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our 'cold' treatment we follow the 'strategy method' and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.

JEL Classification: C91, A13, C90, C81

Suggested Citation

Brandts, Jordi and Charness, Gary, Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Economics Working Paper No. 321, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=139673 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.139673

Jordi Brandts

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona ( email )

UAB Campus
E-08193 Bellaterra
Spain

Gary Charness (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States
805-893-2412 (Phone)
805-893-8830 (Fax)