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Responsibility and Effort in an Experimental Labor Market

Gary Charness
University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Economics Working Paper No. 322

Abstract:
Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that a shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internal impulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchange experiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity (higher effort) when wages are determined by a random process than when assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slight shift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can change behavior. Responsibility-alleviation can be a factor in economic environments featuring substantial personal interaction.

Keywords: Responsibility, social behavior, experiment, generosity

JEL Classifications: A13, C91, D63, J20, J52

Working Paper Series

Date posted: December 02, 1998 ; Last revised: January 13, 2003

Suggested Citation

Charness, Gary, Responsibility and Effort in an Experimental Labor Market. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Economics Working Paper No. 322. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=139676 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.139676

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Contact Information

Gary Charness (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States
805-893-2412 (Phone)
805-893-8830 (Fax)