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Antitrust and 'Free Movement' Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe


Marc Edelman


City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business; Fordham University School of Law

Brian Doyle


Suffolk University Law School

May 1, 2009

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 29, 2009

Abstract:     
This article discusses the legal risks that would emerge if the National Basketball Association ("NBA") and National Football League ("NFL") decide to expand into Europe. Part I of this article explains the differences in operating structure between U.S. and European professional sports leagues. Part II discusses the differences in competition law between the United States and European Community. Part III explains why the legal status of age and education requirements (age/education requirements) is more favorable to professional sports leagues under U.S. law than under EC law. Part IV explains why the legal status of league drafts and reserve systems also might be more favorable to professional sports leagues under U.S. law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: sports, law, sports law, antitrust, international, international antitrust, global, basketball, football, Section Act, collusion, EC Treaty, Treaty of Rome, Free Movement, Article 81, Article 39, non-stutory labor exemption, Mackey, Clarett

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Date posted: April 30, 2009 ; Last revised: May 3, 2009

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc and Doyle, Brian, Antitrust and 'Free Movement' Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe (May 1, 2009). Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 29, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396942

Contact Information

Marc Edelman (Contact Author)
City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business ( email )
One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
Brian Doyle
Suffolk University Law School ( email )
120 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108-4977
United States
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