Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396976
 
 

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Influence without Bribes: A Non-Contracting Model of Campaign Giving and Policymaking


Justin Fox


Washington University in Saint Louis - Department of Political Science

Lawrence S. Rothenberg


University of Rochester - Department of Political Science

April 29, 2009


Abstract:     
Efforts to find empirical evidence that campaign money impacts policymaking choices have offered scant support for group influence. A possible explanation is that the hypothesis that those receiving campaign monies should adjust their policy choices to favor their donor requires the untenable assumption that groups and legislators can implement contracts. We develop a new, alternative, model in which a policymaking legislator cannot make contracts but cares about policy, fundraising, and reputation. In our model, the group gives only to those it believes shares it policy preferences. Nonetheless, we show that the group's giving impacts incumbent policy choices. Importantly, when groups ideologically match, the relationship between actual contributions and bias is not straightforward. As long as a group is uncertain about a member's primitive policy preference, it can influence her policymaking even when it contributes to her challenger or abstains from giving altogether. A key implication of our model is that empirical work requires a different research design to discern if money biases policymaking.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: interest groups, campaign finance, political agency

JEL Classification: D72

working papers series


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Date posted: April 30, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Fox, Justin and Rothenberg, Lawrence S., Influence without Bribes: A Non-Contracting Model of Campaign Giving and Policymaking (April 29, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396976 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1396976

Contact Information

Justin Fox (Contact Author)
Washington University in Saint Louis - Department of Political Science ( email )
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
HOME PAGE: http://pages.wustl.edu/justinfox
Lawrence S. Rothenberg
University of Rochester - Department of Political Science ( email )
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
585-273-4903 (Phone)
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