Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1399189
 
 

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Reducing Fraud against the Government: Using FOIA Disclosures in Qui Tam Litigation


Eric M. Fraser


Osborn Maledon, PA

March 31, 2008

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 1, p. 497, 2008
False Claims Act & Qui Tam Quarterly Review, Vol. 49, p. 159, July 2008

Abstract:     
The False Claims Act prohibits fraud against the government. Unsurprisingly, fraud against the government remains common despite the statute-fraudsters must return billions of dollars in government money each year, and billions more dollars of fraud remain undetected. Through the qui tam provision, the government has enlisted the help of private citizens to discover and prosecute fraud. The program has helped to recover over half of the total recovered fraud over the past two decades. But some courts have threatened this program by holding that information disclosed through the Freedom of Information Act triggers the public disclosure bar of the qui tam provision. This interpretation conflicts with the language of the statute, leads to absurd results, ignores the statutory history, and destroys the incentives for private parties to help uncover fraud. An investigation into models of information secrecy and the efficient markets hypothesis reveals the boundaries of the public disclosure bar as defined in the statute. The language, history, and incentives structure of the statute all lead to the conclusion that some FOIA disclosures do not necessarily trigger the public disclosure bar.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: False Claims Act, qui tam, fraud, FOIA, efficient markets

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Date posted: May 7, 2009 ; Last revised: May 11, 2009

Suggested Citation

Fraser, Eric M., Reducing Fraud against the Government: Using FOIA Disclosures in Qui Tam Litigation (March 31, 2008). University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 1, p. 497, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1399189

Contact Information

Eric M. Fraser (Contact Author)
Osborn Maledon, PA ( email )
2929 North Central Avenue
Suite 2100
Phoenix, AZ 85012
United States
602-640-9321 (Phone)
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