Transparency in Global Merger Review: A Limited Role for the WTO?
Keith R. Fisher
University of New Hampshire School of Law (formerly Franklin Pierce Law Center)
May 8, 2009
Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance, Vol. 11, No. 327, 2006
This article identifies certain problems faced by parties to transnational merger transactions in view of the global proliferation in recent years of competition (and, specifically, merger review) laws. After considering the pros and cons of merger remedies (both structural and behavioral) that may be offered to mitigate potentially anticompetitive effects and illustrating (through a case study of the GE/Honeywell transaction) the pitfalls of divergent market definition even as between two legal regimes employing substantially similar standards, the article reviews and critiques proposals for establishing a supranational competition authority under the aegis of the World Trade Organization. While rejecting the WTO as institutionally and politically unsuitable for such a role, the article concludes by identifying certain modest, procedural functions the WTO might usefully perform in order to make transnational merger review fairer and more efficient.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 85
Keywords: merger review, antitrust, competition, WTO, European Union, merger remedies
JEL Classification: F13, G18, G34, K21, L41, L42, L44Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 9, 2009
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