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What Drives the Comparability Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption?


Stefano Cascino


London School of Economics

Joachim Gassen


Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics; Humboldt University of Berlin - Center for Applied Statistics and Economics (CASE)

September 23, 2012


Abstract:     
The mandatory adoption of IFRS by many countries worldwide fuels the expectation that financial accounting information might become more comparable across countries. This expectation is opposed to an alternative view that stresses the importance of incentives in shaping accounting information. We provide evidence on this debate by investigating the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting information around the world. Using two comparability proxies based on De Franco et al. [2011], our results suggest that the overall comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption is marginal. We hypothesize that heterogeneity in IFRS compliance explains the limited comparability effect. To test this conjecture, we first hand-collect data on IFRS compliance for a sample of German and Italian firms and find that firm-, region-, and country-level incentives systematically shape accounting compliance. We then use the identified compliance determinants to explain the variance in the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption and find it to vary systematically with firm-level compliance determinants, suggesting that only firms with high compliance incentives experience substantial increases in comparability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: international accounting, IFRS, comparability, compliance, reporting incentives

JEL Classification: M41, G14, F42

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Date posted: May 14, 2009 ; Last revised: September 26, 2012

Suggested Citation

Cascino, Stefano and Gassen, Joachim, What Drives the Comparability Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption? (September 23, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402206 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1402206

Contact Information

Stefano Cascino
London School of Economics ( email )
Department of Accounting
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 6457 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 7420 (Fax)
Joachim Gassen (Contact Author)
Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics ( email )
Spandauer Str. 1
Berlin, D-10099
Germany
+49 30 2093 5764 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5670 (Fax)
Humboldt University of Berlin - Center for Applied Statistics and Economics (CASE) ( email )
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin, D-10178
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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