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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402891
 
 

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Inferring Strategic Voting


Kei Kawai


Northwestern University

Yasutora Watanabe


Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

April 17, 2012


Abstract:     
We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [63.4%, 84.9%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction [1.4%, 4.2%] of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: strategic voting, set estimation, partially identified models, discrete choice models

JEL Classification: D7, H8

working papers series





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Date posted: May 13, 2009 ; Last revised: May 5, 2012

Suggested Citation

Kawai, Kei and Watanabe, Yasutora, Inferring Strategic Voting (April 17, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402891 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1402891

Contact Information

Kei Kawai
Northwestern University ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
Yasutora Watanabe (Contact Author)
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology ( email )
HKUST Business School
Clear Water Bay, Kowloon
Hong Kong
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