Inferring Strategic Voting
Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy
April 17, 2012
We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [63.4%, 84.9%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction [1.4%, 4.2%] of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: strategic voting, set estimation, partially identified models, discrete choice models
JEL Classification: D7, H8working papers series
Date posted: May 13, 2009 ; Last revised: May 5, 2012
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