Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402964
 
 

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Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption


Kenneth W. Abbott


Arizona State University

2001

Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 4, pp. 275, 2001

Abstract:     
During the 1990s, the OECD and numerous other international organizations adopted conventions and other instruments designed to control bribery and corruption in international business. The WTO, however, took no such action, and a related initiative on transparency in government procurement has not yet produced any results. This article examines what one can learn about rule-making in the WTO from its failure to act in this case. Much of the explanation for the inaction lay outside the organization, in the political incentives facing major actors. Yet structural characteristics of the WTO, its approach to legalization, and its negotiating processes also played significant roles. These factors should be addressed if the organization is to deal effectively with the controversial issues now on its agenda.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: World Trade Organization, international organizations, international business

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Date posted: May 18, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Kenneth W., Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption (2001). Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 4, pp. 275, 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402964

Contact Information

Kenneth Wayne Abbott (Contact Author)
Arizona State University ( email )
Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
480-965-5917 (Phone)
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