What's Wrong with Infringements (Insofar as Infringements are Not Wrong)?: A Reply
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - School of Law - Camden
Law and Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2008
An earlier article of mine, 'Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating Distinction and its Place in the Theory of Rights', was devoted to rebutting Judith Jarvis Thomson's arguments in favor of incorporating the distinction between (permissibly) infringing and (impermissibly) violating a right. In 'A Defence of Infringement', Andrew Botterell maintains that my criticisms and attempted rebuttals of Thomson's position fail, and that despite my efforts to show otherwise, the category of right infringements is secure. In this reply, I explain why I demur.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 15Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 18, 2009
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