Farsighted House Allocation

11 Pages Posted: 18 May 2009

See all articles by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus

Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus

University of Lausanne

Flip Klijn

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Markus Walzl

Bamberg University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 12, 2009

Abstract

In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else.

Keywords: housing markets, indivisible goods, farsightedness, von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, top trading cycles, competitive allocations

JEL Classification: D63, D70

Suggested Citation

Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth and Klijn, Flip and Walzl, Markus, Farsighted House Allocation (May 12, 2009). Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 09-129, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1403469 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1403469

Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne ( email )

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, Vaud CH-1015
Switzerland

Flip Klijn

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Markus Walzl

Bamberg University - Department of Economics ( email )

Kirschaeckerstrasse 39
Bamberg, 96045
Germany

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