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Rewriting the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Name of Dynamic Competition


Gregory Sidak


Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University; Criterion Economics, L.L.C.

David Teece


University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

May 18, 2009

George Mason Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 885-894, 2009

Abstract:     
We favor revision of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Our preliminary comments in this essay are based on a work in progress that we provisionally entitle, “Favoring Dynamic Competition over Static Competition.” The eventual paper will address, in greater detail than we can explore here, how government enforcement agencies and courts would apply a more explicitly dynamic model of competition to merger analysis. We pose the following question: How must competition policy evolve if it is explicitly to favor Schumpeterian (dynamic) competition over neoclassical (static) competition? Of course, one also could ask that question with respect to intellectual property law and sector-specific regulation of network industries. We intend to do so in our eventual paper.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

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Date posted: May 14, 2009 ; Last revised: November 2, 2009

Suggested Citation

Sidak, Gregory and Teece, David, Rewriting the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Name of Dynamic Competition (May 18, 2009). George Mason Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 885-894, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1403930

Contact Information

J. Gregory Sidak (Contact Author)
Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University ( email )
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Criterion Economics, L.L.C. ( email )
1614 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20009
United States
(202) 518-5121 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.criterioneconomics.com
David J. Teece
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
(510) 647-1075 (Phone)
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