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Rationalizable Implementation

Dirk Bergemann
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics

Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics

May 13, 2009

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697

Abstract:
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show that it is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.

Keywords: Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

JEL Classifications: C79, D82

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 14, 2009 ; Last revised: May 14, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen Edward, Rationalizable Implementation (May 13, 2009). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1403934

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Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author) Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email ) New Haven, CT 06520-8268 United States 203-432-3592 (Phone) 203-432-2128 (Fax) HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/
Stephen Edward Morris Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email ) Princeton, NJ 08544-1021 United States

Abstract

References (23)

Date posted: May 14, 2009 ; Last revised: May 14, 2009

Suggested Citation

Contact Information

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Stephen Edward Morris