Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics
Princeton University - Department of Economics
May 13, 2009
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show that it is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity
JEL Classification: C79, D82working papers series
Date posted: May 14, 2009
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.410 seconds