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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1406213
 
 

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A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Parallel Pricing in Oligopolistic Markets


Alan J. Devlin


Latham & Watkins

May, 17 2009

Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59, p. 1111, 2007

Abstract:     
This Note seeks to address a systemic and difficult issue in the field of antitrust, namely the problem of proving concerted action for the purpose of price-fixing claims in oligopolistic markets. While antitrust law has been markedly successful in eliminating express cartels, competition policy has been equally noteworthy for its failure to effectively address instances of parallel pricing that may have an economically analogous effect to explicit price-fixing. Though the law has long viewed this shortcoming as an inevitable consequence of market structure, this Note articulates both a different conclusion and a novel solution.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

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Date posted: July 4, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Devlin, Alan J., A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Parallel Pricing in Oligopolistic Markets (May, 17 2009). Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59, p. 1111, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1406213

Contact Information

Alan James Devlin (Contact Author)
Latham & Watkins ( email )
United States
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