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Management Fashion Pay-for-Performance for CEOsKatja RostUniversity of Zurich - Institute for Organization and Administrative Science Margit OsterlohProfessor of Management Science; Professor (em.) University of Zurich April 1, 2009 Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 61, pp. 119-149, April 2009 Abstract: We show theoretically and empirically that Pay-for-Performance, like many management fashions, has not achieved its intended aim. Our research focuses on previous empirical studies that examine the relation between variable executive pay and firm performance on various different dates. Our results indicate that a variable CEO income contributes very little to the increase of the firm’s performance, and that CEO salary and firm performance are not linked. The example of Pay-for-Performance shows that in the long run, many management fashions do not solve the problems that they promise to solve.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32 Keywords: CEO Compensation, Corporate Governance, Crowding Out, Management Fashion, Pay-for-Performance JEL Classification: G 35, O31, J41 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: May 19, 2009Suggested Citation |
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