Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation
Kjell Arne Brekke
University of Oslo - Department of Economics; University of Oslo - Frisch Center
Karen Evelyn Hauge
University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research
University of Oslo - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
University of Oslo - Department of Economics; University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2647
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between two group types, where one type donate a fixed amount to a charity. Contributions in these groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more responsible employees.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33
Keywords: altruism, conditional, cooperation, self-selection
JEL Classification: D11, D12, D64, H41working papers series
Date posted: May 19, 2009
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