Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407250
 
 

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Import Safety Rules Should Not Hinder Legitimate Generic Drug Markets: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)


Kevin Outterson


Boston University School of Law

2009

IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, Cary Coglianese, Adam Finkel, David Zaring, eds., The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 9-25

Abstract:     
Trade agreement negotiations are routinely cloaked in secrecy, a model that may have suited the Eighteenth Century, but has no place in modern democracies. Transparency deficits have led to capture by powerful industries, sometimes to the detriment of public health. This is a standard account of the WTO TRIPS Agreement, but the pattern is being repeated, in a new regime, in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and related efforts. In the context of pharmaceuticals, ACTA should be limited to deliberate trademark violations and should not be expanded to encompass other intellectual property rights such as patent infringement. Recent seizures of generic medicines by Dutch authorities highlight the danger to legitimate and valuable global generic drug markets from overzealous enforcement of border control regimes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: counterfeit, drug, pharmaceutical, Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement, ACTA, IMPACT

JEL Classification: K11, K23, K33

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Date posted: May 25, 2009 ; Last revised: July 30, 2014

Suggested Citation

Outterson, Kevin, Import Safety Rules Should Not Hinder Legitimate Generic Drug Markets: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (2009). IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, Cary Coglianese, Adam Finkel, David Zaring, eds., The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 9-25. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407250

Contact Information

Kevin Outterson (Contact Author)
Boston University School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
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