Jonathan B. Wiener
Barak D. Richman
Duke University - School of Law
July 1, 2009
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW, Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, eds., Forthcoming
Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 250
This paper is a draft of a chapter for a forthcoming book, Public Choice and Public Law, edited by Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, to be published by Edward Elgar. This chapter reviews the literature on the selection of regulatory policy instruments, from both normative and positive perspectives. It first reviews the mechanism design literature to identify normative objectives in selecting among the menu or toolbox of policy instruments. The chapter then discusses the public choice and positive political theory literatures and the variety of models developed to attempt to predict the actual selection of alternative policy instruments. It begins with simpler early models focusing on interest group politics and proceeds to more complicated models that incorporate both supply and demand for policy, the role of policy entrepreneurs, behavioral and cognitive choice, and public perceptions and mass politics. It compares these theories to empirical experience. The chapter examines literature in law, economics, political science, and related fields, and it draws examples from US, European, and international regulation. It concludes with suggestions for future research.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44
Date posted: May 21, 2009 ; Last revised: October 6, 2012
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