References (52)


Citations (2)



Strong Managers, Weak Boards?

Renee B. Adams

University of New South Wales, Department of Banking and Finance; ECGI; FIRN; ABFER

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

May 23, 2009

Many governance reform proposals are based on the view that boards have been too friendly to executives, for example, by awarding them excessive pay. Although boards are often on friendly terms with executives, it is less clear that they have systematically failed to function in the interests of shareholders. Understanding board monitoring requires a theory of boards that takes into account how firms provide incentives for their CEOs through other means. We develop a model in which a CEO's ownership stake and private benefits have opposite effects on his willingness to share private information with an independent board of directors. To encourage the CEO to communicate, the board may optimally commit to a low monitoring intensity when either CEO ownership is low or private benefits are high. Our model suggests that the existing cross-section evidence on the correlation between board composition and CEO ownership and tenure needs reevaluation. Using a new proxy for board monitoring, we provide new evidence that this cross-sectional correlation appears to be non-monotonic, with board independence first decreasing and then increasing in CEO ownership and tenure. We discuss the implications of our model for the design and evaluation of governance structures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Board Composition, Corporate Governance, Board Monitoring, Private Benefits, Ownership Structure

JEL Classification: G34, L22, J41, J44

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Date posted: May 27, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Adams, Renee B. and Ferreira, Daniel, Strong Managers, Weak Boards? (May 23, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1409833 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1409833

Contact Information

Renée B. Adams
University of New South Wales, Department of Banking and Finance ( email )
Sydney, NSW 2052
+61(2)93854280 (Phone)

B-1050 Brussels
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Daniel Ferreira (Contact Author)
London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
B-1050 Brussels
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN

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References:  52
Citations:  2

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