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Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries?


Fredrik Andersson


Government of the United States of America - Risk Analysis Division

Matthew Freedman


Cornell University - Department of Economics; Cornell University - School of Industrial and Labor Relations

John Haltiwanger


University of Maryland - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Julia Lane


American Institutes for Research; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Kathryn L. Shaw


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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The Economic Journal, Vol. 119, Issue 538, pp. F308-F332, June 2009

Abstract:     
Innovative firms need to hire and motivate highly talented workers. This article connects the potential returns to innovation to the structure of compensation for skilled employees. We show that the software firms that operate in software sectors with high potential upside gains to innovation pay more to ‘star’ workers than do other firms that operate in stable markets. Firms operating in product domains with highly skewed positive returns pay employees more in up-front starting salaries and offer higher compensation growth. The large estimated effects on earnings are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls for worker and firm characteristics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: May 27, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Andersson, Fredrik Daniel, Freedman, Matthew, Haltiwanger, John C., Lane, Julia and Shaw, Kathryn L., Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries? (0000). The Economic Journal, Vol. 119, Issue 538, pp. F308-F332, June 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410309 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02277.x

Contact Information

Per Fredrik Daniel Andersson
Government of the United States of America - Risk Analysis Division ( email )
250 E Street, SW
Washington, DC 20219
United States
Matthew Freedman
Cornell University - Department of Economics ( email )
Ithaca, NY
United States
Cornell University - School of Industrial and Labor Relations ( email )
Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
United States
John C. Haltiwanger
University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )
College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3504 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Julia Lane
American Institutes for Research ( email )
1990 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-1107
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.iza.org
Kathryn L. Shaw
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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