Defense Procurement: Fraud, Penalties, and Contractor Influence
Jonathan M. Karpoff
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business
D. Scott Lee
University of Nevada, Las Vegas - Lee Business School
Valaria P. Vendrzyk
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Accounting and Information Systems
Journal of Political Economy, 107, August 1999, 809-842.
Press reports of military procurement fraud investigations, indictments, and suspensions are associated with significantly negative average abnormal returns in the stocks of affected firms. Abnormal stock returns are significantly less negative, however, for firms ranking among the Top 100 defense contractors than for unranked contractors, even after controlling for firm size, the fraud's characteristics, and the firm's recidivism. Unranked contractors are penalized heavily for procurement frauds, experiencing both a decline in market value and a subsequent loss in government-derived revenues. Furthermore, these losses are related to the percentage of the firm's revenues that derive from government contracts. Influential contractors, in contrast, are penalized lightly, experiencing negligible changes in share value and government contract revenue.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
JEL Classification: D21, G38, H57, K23, K42, L14Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 8, 1998 ; Last revised: September 18, 2012
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