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Defense Procurement: Fraud, Penalties, and Contractor Influence

Jonathan M. Karpoff
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

D. Scott Lee
Texas A&M University - Department of Finance

Valaria P. Vendrzyk
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Accounting and Information Systems



Journal of Political Economy, November 16, 1998

Abstract:     
Press reports of military procurement fraud investigations, indictments, and suspensions are associated with significantly negative average abnormal returns in the stocks of affected firms. Abnormal stock returns are significantly less negative, however, for firms ranking among the Top 100 defense contractors than for unranked contractors, even after controlling for firm size, the fraud's characteristics, and the firm's recidivism. Unranked contractors are penalized heavily for procurement frauds, experiencing both a decline in market value and a subsequent loss in government-derived revenues. Furthermore, these losses are related to the percentage of the firm's revenues that derive from government contracts. Influential contractors, in contrast, are penalized lightly, experiencing negligible changes in share value and government contract revenue.

JEL Classifications: D21, G38, H57, K23, K42, L14

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: December 08, 1998 ; Last revised: August 29, 2008

Suggested Citation

Karpoff, Jonathan M., Lee, D. Scott and Vendrzyk, Valaria P., Defense Procurement: Fraud, Penalties, and Contractor Influence (1998). Journal of Political Economy, November 16, 1998. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=141090


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Contact Information

D. Scott Lee (Contact Author)
Texas A&M University - Department of Finance ( email )
College Station, TX 77843-4218
United States
979-845-4840 (Phone)
979-845-3884 (Fax)
Jonathan M. Karpoff
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
206-685-4954 (Phone)
206-221-6856 (Fax)
Valaria P. Vendrzyk
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Accounting and Information Systems ( email )
Pamplin College of Business
Blacksburg, VA 24061
United States
540-231-2527 (Phone)
540-231-2511 (Fax)
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