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Defense Procurement: Fraud, Penalties, and Contractor Influence
Jonathan M. Karpoff University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business D. Scott Lee Texas A&M University - Department of Finance Valaria P. Vendrzyk Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Accounting and Information Systems Journal of Political Economy, November 16, 1998 Abstract: Press reports of military procurement fraud investigations, indictments, and suspensions are associated with significantly negative average abnormal returns in the stocks of affected firms. Abnormal stock returns are significantly less negative, however, for firms ranking among the Top 100 defense contractors than for unranked contractors, even after controlling for firm size, the fraud's characteristics, and the firm's recidivism. Unranked contractors are penalized heavily for procurement frauds, experiencing both a decline in market value and a subsequent loss in government-derived revenues. Furthermore, these losses are related to the percentage of the firm's revenues that derive from government contracts. Influential contractors, in contrast, are penalized lightly, experiencing negligible changes in share value and government contract revenue.
JEL Classifications: D21, G38, H57, K23, K42, L14 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: December 08, 1998 ; Last revised: August 29, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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