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Implementing Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits in California

Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Princeton University - Center for Information Technology Policy; University of California, Berkeley - School of Information

Luke W. Miratrix
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Statistics

Philip B. Stark
University of California, Berkeley

Melvin Briones
affiliation not provided to SSRN

Elaine Ginnold
affiliation not provided to SSRN

Freddie Oakley
affiliation not provided to SSRN

Martin Peaden
affiliation not provided to SSRN

Gail Pellerin
affiliation not provided to SSRN

Tom Stanionis
affiliation not provided to SSRN

Tricia Webber
affiliation not provided to SSRN


May 28, 2009

Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections 2009 (EVT/WOTE '09)

Abstract:     
Risk-limiting post-election audits limit the chance of certifying an electoral outcome if the outcome is not what a full hand count would show. Building on previous work, we report on pilot risk-limiting audits in four elections during 2008 in three California counties: one during the February 2008 Primary Election in Marin County and three during the November 2008 General Elections in Marin, Santa Cruz and Yolo Counties. We explain what makes an audit risk-limiting and how existing and proposed laws fall short. We discuss the differences among our four pilot audits. We identify challenges to practical, efficient risk-limiting audits and conclude that current approaches are too complex to be used routinely on a large scale. One important logistical bottleneck is the difficulty of exporting data from commercial election management systems in a format amenable to audit calculations. Finally, we propose a bare-bones risk-limiting audit that is less efficient than these pilot audits, but avoids many practical problems.

Keywords: elections, auditing, statistics, pilot studies, election auditing, risk-limiting audits, risk, e-voting, electronic voting

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 29, 2009 ; Last revised: July 29, 2009

Suggested Citation

Hall, Joseph Lorenzo, Miratrix, Luke W., Stark, Philip B., Briones, Melvin, Ginnold, Elaine, Oakley, Freddie, Peaden, Martin, Pellerin, Gail, Stanionis, Tom and Webber, Tricia, Implementing Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits in California (May 28, 2009). Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections 2009 (EVT/WOTE '09). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411219


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Contact Information

Joseph Lorenzo Hall (Contact Author)
Princeton University - Center for Information Technology Policy ( email )
Sherrerd Hall, 3rd Floor
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08540
United States
University of California, Berkeley - School of Information ( email )
102 South Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-4600
United States
Martin Peaden
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Melvin Briones
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Elaine Ginnold
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Luke W. Miratrix
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Statistics ( email )
United States
Freddie Oakley
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Gail Pellerin
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Tom Stanionis
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Philip B. Stark
University of California, Berkeley ( email )
Department of Statistics
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-2781 (Phone)
Tricia Webber
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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