Rational Attention Allocation over the Business Cycle
Marcin T. Kacperczyk
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
New York University Stern School of Business, Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
New York University - Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
August 14, 2012
The literature assessing whether mutual fund managers have skill typically regards market timing or stock picking skills as immutable attributes of a manager or fund. Yet, measures of these skills appear to vary over the business cycle. This paper offers a rational explanation, arguing that timing and picking are tasks. A skilled manager can choose how much of each task to attend to. Using tools from the rational inattention literature, we show that in booms, a manger should pick stocks and in recessions, he should pay more attention to his market timing. The model predicts equilibrium outcomes in a world where a fraction of managers have skill and invest alongside unskilled investors. The predictions about funds' covariance with payoff shocks, cross-fund dispersion, and their excess returns are all supported by the data. In turn, these findings offer new evidence to support two broader ideas: that some investment managers have skill and that attention is allocated rationally.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 63
Keywords: information choice, investment management, business cycle
JEL Classification: D8, E32, G11, G12, G14, G23working papers series
Date posted: May 29, 2009 ; Last revised: August 15, 2012
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