Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411660
 


 



Spectrum Auctions and the Public Interest


Ellen P. Goodman


Rutgers University School of Law - Camden


Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 7, 2009

Abstract:     
Last year, the Federal Communications Commission held its largest ever spectrum auction, selling exclusive rights to use coveted wireless frequencies for approximately $20 billion. This turned out to be the largest ever single auction of public property in U.S. history. Aside from its sheer magnitude, the auction of frequencies in the 700 MHz band was notable for the federal government's attempt to use the auction process as a mechanism to value various conflicting public policy goals. For the first time, the FCC set out to ascertain just how much a contested policy goal would cost in foregone auction revenue and vowed to give up the goal if it cost too much.

This use of auctions as a heuristic for valuing public interest goals raises interesting questions about the relationship between markets and policy, and between government as a proprietor of public resources and as a regulator of those resources. I argue that it is possible to use auction results to inform the policy process without elevating revenue goals over other public policy objectives. In the 700 MHz auction, however, the FCC misunderstood what information auctions can yield and then failed to design an auction that would supply even that information. Correcting these problems for the spectrum auctions of the future - what may be the last great "land rush" to obtain wireless resources valued at more than $1 trillion - would lead to a more rational, transparent, and equitable communications policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: spectrum, auctions, telecommunications, wireless, communications policy, public interest, public policy, regulation, administrative law, FCC

JEL Classification: K23

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Date posted: May 30, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Goodman, Ellen P., Spectrum Auctions and the Public Interest. Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 7, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411660

Contact Information

Ellen P. Goodman (Contact Author)
Rutgers University School of Law - Camden ( email )
217 N. 5th Street
Camden, NJ 08102-1203
United States
856-225-6393 (Phone)
856-225-6516 (Fax)
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