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Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation


Muriel Niederle


Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alvin E. Roth


HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

M. Utku Ünver


Boston College - Department of Economics

May 2009

NBER Working Paper No. w15006

Abstract:     
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

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Date posted: June 1, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Niederle, Muriel, Roth, Alvin E. and Ünver, M. Utku, Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation (May 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w15006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1412018

Contact Information

Muriel Niederle (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Alvin E. Roth
HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-5447 (Phone)
617-496-7379 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Utku Unver
Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )
140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
+1 (617) 552 2217 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver
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