References (1)



Governments as Cartel Victims

John M. Connor

Purdue University; American Antitrust Institute (AAI)

May 21, 2009

AAI Working Paper No. 09-03

In this note, I assemble simple empirical evidence on the severity of monetary penalties on modern international cartels, focusing on whether there are systematic differences in severity between cases in which the government itself is the victim of overcharging versus cases where the brunt of the economic injuries are borne by businesses and consumers. I find that government-sector fines are significantly higher relative to affected sales when government bid rigging is the principal form of cartel conduct. This pattern is found across nearly all jurisdictions. These findings call into question whether enforcement resources are tilted unwisely towards cases where the government is the victim.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: government procurement, antitrust, penalties

Download This Paper

Date posted: June 1, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Connor, John M., Governments as Cartel Victims (May 21, 2009). AAI Working Paper No. 09-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1412463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1412463

Contact Information

John M. Connor (Contact Author)
Purdue University ( email )
610 Purdue Mall
West Lafayette, IN 47906
United States
+1 765-494-4600 (Phone)
American Antitrust Institute (AAI)
2919 Ellicott Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20008-1022
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.antitrustinstitute.com
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 479
Downloads: 107
Download Rank: 160,607
References:  1

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.344 seconds