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Networks, Hierarchies, and Markets: Aggregating Collective Problem Solving in Social Systems

David Lazer
Northeastern University - Department of Political Science; Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government

Ines A. Mergel
Syracuse University - Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs

Curtis E. Ziniel
University of California, Riverside

Kevin M. Esterling
University of California, Riverside - Department of Political Science

Michael A. Neblo
Ohio State University - Department of Political Science


June 2, 2009

HKS Working Paper No. RWP09_17

Abstract:     
How do decentralized systems collectively solve problems? Here we explore the interplay among three canonical forms of collective organization - markets, networks, and hierarchies - in aggregating decentralized problem solving. We examine these constructs in the context of how the offices of members of Congress individually and collectively wrestle with the Internet, and, in particular, their use of official websites. Each office is simultaneously making decisions about how to utilize their website. These decisions are only partially independent, where offices are looking at each other for lessons, following the same directives from above about what to do with the websites, and confront the same array of potential vendors to produce their website. Here we present the initial results from interviews with 99 Congressional offices and related survey of 100 offices about their decisions regarding how to use official Member websites. Strikingly, we find that there are relatively few efforts by offices to evaluate what constituents want or like on their websites. Further, we find that diffusion occurs at the "tip of the iceberg": offices often look at each others' websites (which are publicly visible), but rarely talk to each other about their experiences or how they manage what is on their websites (which are not publicly visible). We also find that there are important market drivers of what is on websites, with the emergence of a small industry of companies seeking to serve the 440 Members. Hierarchical influences - through the House and through the party conferences - also constrain and subsidize certain practices.

Keywords: Institutional Entrepreneurship, Collaborative Learning, Information Technology, Congress, Diffusion, intra-, inter- and extra-organizational influence, online practices

Working Paper Series

Date posted: June 04, 2009 ; Last revised: June 24, 2009

Suggested Citation

Lazer, David, Mergel, Ines A., Ziniel, Curtis E., Esterling, Kevin M. and Neblo, Michael A., Networks, Hierarchies, and Markets: Aggregating Collective Problem Solving in Social Systems (June 2, 2009). HKS Working Paper No. RWP09_17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413298


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Contact Information

David Lazer (Contact Author)
Northeastern University - Department of Political Science ( email )
Boston, MA 02115
United States
617-373-2796 (Phone)
617-373-5311 (Fax)
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Mailbox 114
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-0102 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/david-lazer
Kevin M. Esterling
University of California, Riverside - Department of Political Science ( email )
Riverside, CA 92521
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.politicalscience.ucr.edu/people/faculty/esterling/index.html
Ines A. Mergel
Syracuse University - Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs ( email )
400 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244
United States
Michael A. Neblo
Ohio State University - Department of Political Science ( email )
Columbus, OH 43210
United States
Curtis E. Ziniel
University of California, Riverside ( email )
Riverside, CA 92521
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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