Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413775
 
 

References (206)



 
 

Citations (42)



 


 



Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting


S.P. Kothari


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Karthik Ramanna


Harvard University - Harvard Business School

Douglas J. Skinner


The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

September 13, 2010

Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming
MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4740-09
Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 09-137
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business Working Paper No. 09-22

Abstract:     
Based on extant literature, we review the positive theory of GAAP. The theory predicts that GAAP’s principal focus is on control (performance measurement and stewardship) and that verifiability and conservatism are critical features of a GAAP shaped by market forces. We recognize the advantage of using fair values in circumstances where these are based on observable prices in liquid secondary markets, but caution against expanding fair values to financial reporting more generally. We conclude that rather than converging U.S. GAAP with IFRS, competition between the FASB and the IASB would allow GAAP to better respond to market forces.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 126

JEL Classification: M41, M44, M47

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: June 3, 2009 ; Last revised: September 17, 2010

Suggested Citation

Kothari, S.P. and Ramanna, Karthik and Skinner, Douglas J., Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting (September 13, 2010). Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming; MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4740-09; Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 09-137; University of Chicago - Booth School of Business Working Paper No. 09-22. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413775

Contact Information

S.P. Kothari (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
E52-325
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0994 (Phone)
617-253-0603 (Fax)
Karthik Ramanna
Harvard University - Harvard Business School ( email )
Morgan 389
Boston, MA 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.hbs.edu/kramanna
Douglas J. Skinner
The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7137 (Phone)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 14,419
Downloads: 3,346
Download Rank: 1,428
References:  206
Citations:  42

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.468 seconds