Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413900
 
 

Citations



 


 



Did the Airline Tariff Publishing Case Reduce Collusion?


Amalia R. Miller


University of Virginia - Department of Economics

June 2009

Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
In December 1992, the US Department of Justice filed suit against eight major domestic airlines and the Airline Tariff Publishing Company in order to reduce opportunities for collusion in the industry. The lawsuit ended with consent decrees limiting the ability of airlines to communicate surreptitiously through the shared fare database. This paper measures the effects of the litigation and its settlement on industry performance, comparing changes in outcomes between market segments that were more and less likely to be affected by the ATP case. Prices fell in response to the investigation, but increased following the settlement, while the number of tickets sold in affected markets declined. The importance of multi-market contact also dropped and then recovered. The ATP case had at best a temporary effect on airline collusion.

Keywords: airlines, collusion, antitrust, facilitating practices

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L41, L93

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: June 4, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Miller, Amalia R., Did the Airline Tariff Publishing Case Reduce Collusion? (June 2009). Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413900

Contact Information

Amalia R. Miller (Contact Author)
University of Virginia (UVA) - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States
HOME PAGE: http://people.virginia.edu/~am5by/
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