Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting
Lars E. O. Svensson
Sveriges Riksbank; Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Glenn D. Rudebusch
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 1999
Policy rules that are consistent with inflation targeting are examined in a small macroeconometric model of the U.S. economy. We compare the properties and outcomes of explicit "instrument rules" as well as "targeting rules." The latter, which imply implicit instrument rules, may be closer to actual operating procedures of inflation-targeting central banks. We find that inflation forecasts are central for good policy rules under inflation targeting. Some simple instrument and targeting rules do remarkably well relative to the optimal rule; others, including some that are often used as representing inflation targeting, do less well.
Note: When this abstract appeared in a previous issue of Monetary Economics Abstracts, one of the authors was accidentally omitted. Above is the revised contact information for this abstract.
JEL Classification: E52, E58working papers series
Date posted: February 10, 1999
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