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The Foreclosure Crisis and the Anti-Fragmentation Principle in State Property Law

David A. Dana
Northwestern University - School of Law



University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-06
Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 09-14

Abstract:     
Secured credit in homes has been divided and over-divided and spun into so many separate interests that economically rational, socially beneficial modifications of loans are impossible. The mortgage story is a new one but the excessive fragmentation of property and the creation of waste and inefficiency is not new. And our legal tradition of state property law has an answer, in the form of an anti-fragmentation principle. Consistent with this principle, federal government trustees should be authorized to review mortgages and, where modification would yield greater total return than foreclosure, modify the loans. Blind trustee review, moreover, can be achieved without formal condemnations of property interests or the creation of government liability for regulatory takings.

Keywords: mortgages, housing, takings

JEL Classifications: K11, K30

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: June 05, 2009 ; Last revised: July 01, 2009

Suggested Citation

Dana, David A., The Foreclosure Crisis and the Anti-Fragmentation Principle in State Property Law (June 5, 2009). University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming; Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-06; Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 09-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415006


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Contact Information

David A. Dana (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-0240 (Phone)
312-503-2035 (Fax)
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